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Chapter 1
Introduction
Telecommunication services are complex product packages that rely on a large and complex tech-
nical infrastructure. However, fraudulent use of such telecommunication services rarely exploits
hardware vulnerabilities. Instead, most common exploits operate at a business level, capitalizing
on the unexpected interaction between various product packages from multiple providers.
As such, an assumption was made that in order to fully describe the scenarios, a modelling lan-
guage capable of describing value transactions between actors is required. In order to validate
this assumption, a business value modelling language, e3value (cf. section 1.1.2) was selected,
generic (non-misuse) business models were created and four misuse scenarios were modelled. This
report showcases the models, discusses strengths and limitations encountered during modelling
and draws conclusions with regard to the applicability, usability and utility of e3value models in
modelling (Telecom) fraud as well as more generally in Risk Assessment.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Telecommunication services
Telecommunications Service Providers (TSPs) commonly operate in highly competitive and dy-
namic markets, consisting of constellations of actors with conflicting (financial) interests. Thus,
new and increasingly complex products and services are being rushed to market, leaving little
time to assess potential risks. This provides fertile ground for unforeseen fraud or misuse.
Most telecommunications products and services rely on a very complex underlying network ar-
chitecture. This is due to a multitude of different interconnected networks, service providers and
network operators. However, telecom misuse or fraud scenarios are largely independent of the
underlying technical infrastructure. They come to life as an undesirable result of the complex
structure of the tariff plans brought about by the competitive economical environment in which
Telecom providers operate.
As this research is in it’s early stages, to ease the modelling effort, a set of idealizing assump-
tions with regard to the telecommunication services market are used throughout this research:
A contractual period of one month is assumed and used in the models.
Payment plans taken into consideration in this research are: Pre-paid (SIM with credit), Post-
paid (SIM with subscription) and Flat-rate (SIM with unlimited calling). For each, realistic
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Table 1.1: Values used for payment plans
Prepaid Postpaid Flatrate
Initial payment 5,00e 0,00e 0,00e
Monthly payment 0,00e 10,00e 37,50e
Cost per minute 0,03e 0,10e 0,00e
Interconnection fee 0,07e 0,07e 0,07e
Minutes included 334 - ∞
Note
Double minutes
as
welcoming bonus.
∞ ,
until fair use
policy is reached.
costs were pre-determined based on products currently available in the Dutch Telecommu-
nications market in 2014. These costs are listed in Table 1.1
The bubble assumption meaning that for each scenarios and model, only the selected sub-set
of payment plans (which are known to allow for the misuse to take place) are taken into
account.
The behaviour of users is flattened and averages are used to estimate the calling patterns of
different types of users. For each model we consider at most two types of users: malicious
and non-malicious.
.
1.1.2 e3value
The e3value modeling language was first introduced by Gordjin [4] in order to support better
understanding of the economic transactions occurring in an e-commerce environment, where a
constellation of profit-loss responsible entities create, exchange and consume things of economic
value. In other words, “the e3-value methodology provides modeling concepts for showing which
parties exchange things of economic value with whom, and expect what in return.” [5]. Figure 1.1
shows the building blocks of e3value and a simple example, showing the commercial relationships
between the publishers of a number of newspaper tiles, their advertisers and and their readers.
The main building blocks available in the e3value toolkit, as depicted in Figure 1.1, are:
Actor is an independent entity capable of exchanging value. They can represent a person,
market segment, business or role.
Value object is something of value to at least one actor, which can be exchanged with other
actors, such as services, products, money or even customer satisfaction.
Value port is used to represent the ability or desire of an actor to provide or request value
objects. It allows to abstract away from the internal business processes in order to focus
only on the external interaction between actors.
Value interface – groups together two or more value ports belonging to the same actor. It
shows what an actor is willing to offer in return for a a certain value object.
Value exchange – connects two value ports from different actors together as to show the flow
of value objects between actors
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Value offering – is a group of value exchanges in opposing directions used to show reciprocal
value exchanges between actors.
Dependency path – is a chain of value offerings, starting from a Start stimulus and ending in
one or more end stimuli that shows which value offerings occur and when.
Start stimulus – is a need of one of the actors to acquire a certain value object. Connection
elements are used to define which transactions are triggered by each occurrence of the need.
Figure 1.1: Example and legend of an e3value model
Looking at Figure 1.1, we observe that Readers have a need ("Read newspaper"). What the
model then shows is that for each occurrence of this need (each Reader that decides he wants
to read a newspaper), some money is paid by this reader in exchange for a newspaper to the
a Title (an independent news paper). For each such purchase, some money is also cashed in
from an Advertiser in exchange for exposure. Furthermore, as depicted by the end node, for
each such purchase an amount of money is forwarded to the publisher in exchange for a service
(e.g. printing). A single Publisher might own a number of such Titles, which he sees as profit-
loss responsible business units. The purpose of the publisher is to share facilities that require
economies of scale, such as printing, logistics and IT, and to share facilities related to personnel,
finance, etc. Such services are provided to the Titles in exchange for a (part of) the income they
receive from Readers and Advertisers.
Occurrence rates (i.e. average number of times a need is expected to occur per contractual
period) are assigned to Start Stimuli. Valuations (i.e. quantifications of the monetary value
of each value object) are defined as properties of Transactions (if both stakeholders assign the
same value) or Ports (if each stakeholder assigns a different value for the same object). Fractions
(smaller or larger than 1) can be assigned to AND/OR nodes such as to allow for the following
transactions to be triggered a proportional number of times.
The occurrence rates of a start stimulus determine the number of occurrences of each Value
Exchange on the same dependency path. My multiplying the number of occurrences of each
Value Exchange with the valuation of it’s associated Value Object, the tool is able to calculate
the incoming/outgoing money flows of each actor. These money flows can the be added up to
show the profit/loss each actor stands to make per contractual period. By running this analysis
a large number of times, for different occurrence rates of the same need, we are able to generate
various profitability graphs, such as the one shown in Figure 2.4a.
However, it is important to remember that the order is which transactions occur along a depen-
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dency path does not necessarily represent the sequence of activities in real life. Value models are
not process models: they do not describe how processes are carried out or by whom.
1.2 Additional conventions
While creating value models of the mis-use scenarios, it was observed that in order to model
fraud or misuse correctly, supplementary modelling conventions are needed. This is because we
need to be able to represent hidden or unexpected transactions. It is exactly these transactions
that commonly form the basis for of such fraud scenarios. To mitigate this, we introduce three
types of value exchanges:
1. Normal: These value exchanges take place as expected.
2. Dashed: These transactions occur in the world, but are not observable to at least one of
the actors.
3. Dotted: These transactions are expected to occur, but will not.
Figure 1.2: Newly introduced e3value transaction types
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Chapter 2
Scenarios and models
As a first step, a generic (non-malicious) scenario was created which shows the various payment
plans commonly available to customers of Telecom Service Providers: pre-paid, post-paid and
flat-rate. This was done in order to get an impression as to how these various tariff plans could
be modelled in e3value.
Next, two models were created for each scenario: one only showing the expected value trans-
actions and one including hidden or unexpected transactions which enable financial gains by
malicious customers. We call these two alternative models views as each shows the same value
model from the perspective of one of the actors. The first one will show the situation as it is
expected by the telecom provider (as our target of assessment). The second one will provide a
view of the same scenario, but including hidden transactions that only the attacker is aware of.
An important assumption used when creating the models is the following: in each model (except
the base case) only a single payment plan is taken into account. This is because, although a
variety of other plans which influence the profit of the provider exist, we are interested in the
impact and risks of a specific (new) plan.
A second important assumption is about the behaviour of users. Since it would be infeasible to
model an infinite amount of user behaviours, we limit ourselves to at most two types of users per
model: malicious and non-malicious. We use averages to describe their behaviour. Of course,
their parameters can be tweaked to, for example, conduct sensitivity analysis of the results or
create best/worse case estimations.
2.1 Base Case
The base case attempts to describe the complete environment of the telecom provider, from a ser-
vice provision perspective. Obviously, this model is not exhaustive and only provides an overview
of the possible relationships between Telecom providers and their customers by modelling the
most common payment schemes found in the Mobile Telecom sector.
2.1.1 e3value model
The resulting e3value model is shown in Figure 2.1. Users A1-A3 are used to model different
types of payment plans. In that sense, they do not represent individual users but customer types:
User A1 is a user with a normal post-paid plan. This means that once a month the base rate
needs to be paid. When this user makes a call, an extra cost occurs which user A1 promises
to pay. This payment will be made at the end of the period.
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Figure 2.1: Base case - e3value model
User A2 has a pre-paid plan. For each minute of calling, the costs that that occur are deducted
from the user’s account immediately. Most of the time this is done through some kind of
crediting system.
User A3 describes customers with flat-rate plans. This means the user pays a fee once a month
and after this unlimited calling becomes available to him. In order to make a call, the only
thing needed is his subscription.
In the middle of Figure 2.1, provider A is used to represent the TSP from whose perspective
the model is created. This is important as there is a potentially endless constellation of actors that
could be added to the model. However, we choose to only include those actors and transactions
that could potentially influence the profitability of the plans offered by our target of assessment
(Provider A).
In the bottom of the figure we position the receivers of the calls that the customers of Provider
A are placing. In that sense, User B1 and B2 also represent a role: that of users receiving a call
initiated from the network of our target of assessment (Provider A). They can be either part of
the same network (i.e. User B1) or could be customers of another network (i.e. User B2). Note
that since a person could have multiple contracts with various TSPs (or even the same TSP),
it is possible that two or more of the roles depicted in the Figure (A1-A3 and B1-B2) could be
fulfilled by the same physical person.
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(a) Tariff misuse for call termination (b) Money flow
Figure 2.2: Scenario 1
2.2 Scenario 1 - Flat-rate misuse
Mr. Clever (a fraudster) has at least one fixed, mobile or virtual IP connection points with
Carrier A which are billet either as flatrate or in tariff schemes which include capacious minute
budgets. In addition, Mr. Clever has (multiple) fixed, mobile or virtual IP connection points
with Carrier B , which provides bonuses to their customers when they receive calls. The bonus
acts as an incentive for Mr Clever to generate as much incoming traffic as possible to the B
network, leading to an abuse of his contract with provider A.
The source of Mr. Clever’s profit is the call termination fee paid by Carrier A to Carrier B,
which is then partly paid out to Mr. Clever by Carrier B (Mr. Clever’s costs at Carrier A are
fixed due to the chosen tariff).
2.2.1 e3value model
The telecom provider expects regular usage of the plan. His perspective of the business model is
captured in Figure 2.3a. User A3 has flat rate contract with Provider A. User B2 has a contract
with a different provide (Provider B). As Provider A is not expecting any deviant, there is no
problem in User A3 calling User B2. Just an ordinary call. The expected profit of Provider A
can be seen in Figure 2.4a.
However, Mr. Clever, the fraudster, has a different plan (Figure 2.3b). In his model user A3 and
B2 are the same person (or at least working together). A clause unknown to provider A in User
A’s contract with Provider B is introduced. User A now gets 0,055e per incoming minute as a
bonus for generating traffic. Provider B can afford to pay this bonus because of the interconnec-
tion fee of 0.07e per minute it receives from Provider A.
This puts User A (a.k.a. Mr. Clever) in a potentially profitable position. Of course, in order
to get to this profit, Mr. Clever needs to make calls for less than 0,055e per minute. This can
be achieved because of the flat rate plan. Actually, the more minutes are used, the lower the
cost per minute. The expected gain of Mr Clever can be seen in Figure 2.4b.
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(a) Provider A (Provider A view)
(b) Mr. Clever (Mr. Clever view)
Figure 2.3: e3value models for Scenario 1
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(a) Provider A (Provider A view) (b) Mr. Clever (Mr. Clever view)
Figure 2.4: Profitability graphs of Scenario 1
2.3 Scenario 2 - False pretence to pay
The second scenario has some similarities to the previous scenario, but involves an amplified
attack using re-directed calls. Mr. Clever (a fraudster) obtains a large number of prepaid (pay
as you go) SIM cards. These SIM cards are either not (yet) registered or registered using fake or
stolen ID. Furthermore, these SIM cards are billed either as flatrate, have a very low price per
minute or free minutes (upon activation).
In addition to these prepaid SIM cards Mr. Clever manages to establish one postpaid mobile
contract with Carrier A using forged or stolen identity and banking credentials. This is most
easily achieved by hiring a middle-man, which is willing to take a post-paid contract in his name.
This step will probably require some form of payment (assumed 100e). The middle-man’s con-
tract will rack up enormous charges but he never pay the bill. Thus, with respect to the postpaid
mobile contract, this scenario is a matter of fraud involving the false pretence of being willing
and able to pay.
Mr. Clever activates call forwarding on the postpaid mobile connection and sets it up so as to
redirect all calls to a (foreign) number on Carrier B’s network. Mr. Clever again has a contract
with Provider B and again gets a bonus fee for every incoming minute. He then makes the
highest number of possible parallel calls to that postpaid number using the prepaid SIM cards.
This can be done for low costs as they are with the same provider. All these calls will be diverted
to Carrier B and this forwarding will be charged on the postpaid account. For each received call
on the foreign number, Mr. Clever in entitled to a bonus from Provider B.
The fraud detection system (FDS) of Carrier A will eventually detect a violation of the Fair Use
Policy on the postpaid mobile connection contract and disconnect it within the response time.
However, Mr. Clever will never pay the postpaid’s outstanding bill. Finally, Carrier B passes the
received call termination fees in parts on to Mr. Clever, thereby providing a payout per minute
for incoming calls.
2.3.1 e3value models
Figure 2.6a shows the perspective of Provider A (as the target of assessment). In this scenario,
User A buys a prepaid card, pre-loaded with 334 minutes of credit as a welcoming bonus. With
this credit, User A can make calls. On the right side, a different user (User MM) has a postpaid
12
(a) False pretense of being willing and able to pay.
.
(b) Money flow.
.
Figure 2.5: Scenario 2
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plan with the same provider.
In Figure 2.6b the business case of Mr. Clever is shown. Noteworthy are the new hidden
transactions appearing between User A and User MM and User A and Provider B respectively.
Furthermore, the two payments for the post-paid are now dotted (non-occurring). Similarity to
scenario one, this gives Mr. Clever the opportunity to make a profit by exploiting the intended
interaction between the two contracts. The expected financial result of Mr. Clever, for various
amounts of pre-paid SIMs is shown in Figure 2.8. Note that while for a single SIM card Mr.
Clever will not make a profit due to the high initial investment of paying the middleman (MM),
his profits explode once over ten SIMs are used simultaneously. A reciprocal graph showing the
massive loss Provider A would face if User A is acting maliciously is shown in Figure 2.7b. If Mr.
Clever was only to use 20 SIM cards these losses might amount to over 5000e for one month.
This is significantly different than the expected outcome of Figure 2.7a. Of course, the income
gained from non-malicious users should also be considered, as the provider might still make a
profit if only a small percentage of users acts maliciously.
When creating these models, a coordination model was first created to get a better understanding
of the process involved . This was done because this scenario has some clear phases that need
to be completed in a specific order. For example, the phone number needs to be forwarded
before the calling starts. By putting the scenario in an activity diagram, all steps become clearer
and can be checked against the e3value model. It became clear that a connection between two
swim lanes in the activity diagram, was represented by a transaction in the e3value model. The
coordination model is shown in Appendix A (FigureA.1)
The expected financial result of Provider A (per individual user) vs. the non-ideal financial
result of Provider A (individual user) can be seen in Figure 2.7. Figure 2.7a also shows how this
loss scales with the number of SIMS used by the fraudster.
2.4 Scenario 3 - Intercepting e-Payments
Compared to the previous scenarios, the upcoming scenarios are rather technical. This scenario
involves the use of mobile wallets. “The mobile wallet is a new application of mobile payment
that has functionality to supplant a conventional wallet and more. A mobile wallet is a much-
advanced versatile application that includes elements of mobile transactions, as well as other
items one may find in a wallet, such as membership cards, loyalty cards and travel cards.” [14].
These mobile wallets offer a new opportunity for fraud.
For the fraud case we examined, the payment functionality of the wallets is most important.
When some user pays with his mobile wallet, the system sends a message to the service provider.
This provider in its turn orders the transfer of the money from the user’s bank account to the
account of the shop owner.
Fraud with this form of payment can be performed in several ways. For this scenario, a man-
in-the-middle attack was used. This means the Internet packages containing the payment order
are intercepted and tampered with. Here Mr. Clever has two options: changing the destination
or change the destination and the amount. For this scenario the first was chosen. As divergent
numbers are easier detected by the user, it was chosen to change the target account into Mr.
Clever’s. For the execution of this attack, several techniques are available. For this research
however, the specific technique is not important.
2.4.1 e3value models
In order to add quantitative information to the model, additional data is required. As mobile
wallets are a new and upcoming payment method, not a lot of data is available about this. To
14
(a) Provider A (Provider A view)
(b) Mr. Clever (Mr. Clever view)
Figure 2.6: e3value models of Scenario 2
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(a) Provider A (Provider A view) (b) Provider A (Mr. Clever view)
Figure 2.7: Provider A’s profitability graphs for Scenario 2
Figure 2.8: Mr. Clever’s profitability graph for Scenario 2 (Mr. Clever view)
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(a) Provider A (Provider A view)
(b) Mr. Clever (Mr. Clever view)
Figure 2.9: e3value models of Scenario 3
work around this, we use available data about debit card payments (by PIN). This is currently
a very popular payment method in the Netherlands. In 2013 2,660 billion transactions [3] were
completed with an average value of €34,08. This combined with the fact that the amount of
transaction under €10,00 is rising [1] shows the growing importance of digital payment.
This growth is stimulated by businesses. For them, payment by PIN is cheaper than payment
in cash[2]. The average cash payment costs 24 cent as a PIN payment costs 21 cent. From these
costs a small part is a service fee to the provider. Based on data from ING bank [8] this fee is
set at 5,2 cents per transaction. Based on these data and the above established base figure, the
model were created.
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2.5 Scenario 4 - Using someone else’s credit
This scenario is about technical PBX1 exploits. Although not many people know about these
attacks, they are just as likely to occur as an attack on the data network[16].
There are several ways to attack a PBX. As Kuhn [11] describes, the most vulnerable is the re-
mote access feature. Through this feature, for example, Mr. Clever can create a special mailbox
which redirects him to a phone number of his choice (probably generating a bonus fee). Another
option would be to get hold of a telephone within the company and start calling his number from
there [13].
2.5.1 e3value models
Again a little extra information was needed to create the models. Firstly the costs of directing
calls through a PBX was needed. This information was acquired from KPN [10]. Here it was
found that an average call through a PBX costs 0,06e per minute.
A new assumption was also made. It was assumed that the interconnection fee on landlines is
lower than on mobile lines. This is a reasonable assumption, as otherwise KPN would not be
able to make profit. Therefore the interconnection fee was set at 0,035e per minute.
In figure 2.10a the business case as intended by the telecommunication services provider (Provider
A) is modelled. As described above, company A is in the possession of a PBX system. This is
used to make call through provider A and B to User B. In this model nothing extraordinary is
occurring.
In figure 2.10b, the fraudster’s business case is modelled. By hacking into the PBX, he creates
an opportunity for himself to make unauthorized calls. This can be done through the remote
access of the PBX or physical access to one of the phones in the company. However, the technical
means by which this is achieved is not captured in the e3value model .Through the PBX Mr.
Clever will call a number of his choice. This number awards him (or a collaborator) a bonus fee.
As Mr. Clever has no running costs for this scenario (except for the fixed costs of hacking into
the PBX), his profit will be 5,5 cents per called minute. This scenario can be executed some
time before it is detected, so it could become fairly profitable.
1A private branch exchange (PBX) is a telephone exchange or switching system that serves a private orga-
nization and performs concentration of central office lines or trunks and provides intercommunication between a
large number of telephone stations in the organization” [18]
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(a) Provider A (Provider A view)
(b) Mr. Clever (Mr. Clever view)
Figure 2.10: e3value models for Scenario 4
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Chapter 3
Observations & Discussion
3.1 Observations on model creation
Telco fraud cases are not really attacks but misuse cases. Misuse cases are not necessarily against
the law or even against contractual or usage agreements, as they do not involve tampering with
the normal operation of devices or exploiting vulnerabilities in their operation. So the actions
in a telco fraud case are not part of an attack, and are not aimed at accessing an asset owned
by a telco. However, these actions may impact the revenue of the provider as this behaviour
deviates significantly from the provider’s execrations and/or estimations. If we view a contract
between actors in an e3value model as a policy, then the goal of Mr Clever is to find a way
of misusing these contracts to his own advantage, in a way that usually is not intended by the
telcos. His actions are governed by telco contracts. In the two scenarios modelled, no knowledge
of vulnerabilities in IT infrastructures was needed.
Timing is extremely important in relation to this specific case study: the marketing depart-
ment of a telco will want to launch their products without delay and so any kind of initial analysis
of prospective risks arising from proposed products will need to be comprehensive enough to be
meaningful and yet quick enough to be acceptable. Once the product is launched, it will be im-
portant to identify any unacceptable activity at the earliest opportunity, to minimise the losses
associated with this. If information is available from previous misuse scenarios, there may also
be some value in investigating the delay between launch and increasing levels of misuse as a
partial predictor of future expectations.
3.2 Limitations
Based on the e3value models, the profit or loss for both the telecom provider and Mr. Clever could
be calculated. Furthermore, break-even points for all actors can be derived. These calculations
were made based on data from several sources. However information about the current workings
of a telecom provider was obsolete. Assuming the modelling is undertaken by the provider itself,
the computations and models would become more accurate. This however, has no influence on
the method used to calculate these profits.
The fact that e3value does not recognize any kind of order in its execution, is one of its strong
points. But in some cases the order in which the transactions happen is important. For example,
its impossible to make a call with a SIM card that hasn’t been bought yet. The how question
(critical to process models) does not concern us, but the order in which certain transactions are
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executed does matter. This was solved with the use of an activity diagram, but if a language is
created for fraud detection, some way of specifying a high level order is a requirement.
In e3value, all transactions have to be reciprocal. However, a characteristic of fraud is that
sometimes nothing is given in return. This was currently mitigated by using transactions of null
value.
A limitation of the e3value toolkit is that it can only compute profitability graphs for a
static set of parameters. To mitigate this, the e3value computations were ran multiple times
and formulas were extracted which allowed the creation of the profitability graphs based on a
parameter like number of minutes talked or number of SIM cards bought. In order to allow for
sensitivity analysis and determining the impact of various factors on the profitability of the plan,
it is essential that the future model be able to create such graphs automatically.
Finally, in order to be usable in a Risk Assessment process, a method of automatically
identifying opportunities for misuse for a given tariff plan is needed. A possible solution would
be to create a sufficiently large number of fraud scenarios and then train a pattern matching
algorithm to determine if any of those can occur on a given model. However, this assumes a
substantial effort in creating the library and would not work very well for new types of fraud. An
alternative would be to generate non-ideal scenarios by: (1) merging actors, (2) Making payments
non-occurring (like not paying subscription fee at the end of the month) and (2) adding hidden
transactions (like the bonus
3.3 Applicability
The biggest strength of e3value models is also their biggest weakness: they abstract away from
any and all procedural and architectural information. This makes such models easier to use
and understand by non-technical people. Furthermore, they are specialized in describing money
flows.
For the Telecommunication Services sector, and especially for the first two scenarios described
in this document, this makes them ideal: information on the technical infrastructure is un-
obtainable, the process is very simple and the actual attack path almost irrelevant. Describing
the money flows and their triggers is necessary and sufficient to describe the scenarios and not
only derive estimates of both impact for the provide and gain for the fraudsters, but also identify
countermeasures.
However, if we are interested in (preventing) the technical exploits that allow the attack to
happen, or want to reason about the timing, ordering or the possible attack vectors involved
in the attack, more information is needed. This information is not obtainable from an e3value
model. As such, for other more technical scenarios, where the attack involves technical exploits or
social manipulation, not only will a socio-technical model be needed, but might also be sufficient.
Based on feedback from industrial Telecom partners and practitioners, we have identified two
application scenarios for e3value models: (1) assessing financial magnitude of fraud on a new
plan before it is launched and (2) estimating impact of newly discovered fraud possibilities on
existing plans.
The above brings about the question of deciding when and where each type of model is
needed in order to conduct an effective Risk Assessment. This question is to be tackled in future
research, as indicated in Section 3.4. Furthermore, it now becomes crucial to find ways by which
this variety of models can work together in an integrated work-flow. This is also briefly discussed
in Section 3.4.
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3.4 Future Work
This document only presents the results and observations of the first attempt at using e3value
models as an alternative to more traditional architecture models commonly used in Risk Assess-
ment to overcome the obstacles encountered especially in the Telecommunication Services fraud.
Despite showing promising results, there is still a lot left to investigate with regard to the the
utility, usability and applicability of such models as well as with regard to their relationship to
existing models, approaches and tools.
A main topic of research for the coming year is investigating how value models can be inte-
grated into existing Risk Assessment methodologies and frameworks. It is already obvious that
they do not contain sufficient information to allow for the generation of attack vectors. Further-
more, since transformation to or generation of any sort of architecture or coordination model
from an e3value model is not feasible [5], new ways have to be devised to allow exploiting the
information available in these models such that it can be used in a Risk Assessment workflow.
A secondary research topic, party stemming from the above, has to do with investigating
and fleshing out the formal or otherwise relationships between value models and architecture or
coordination (process) models. There exists previous work discussing these relationships , such
as [15, 9, 6] and [17, 12, 7], respectively. However, none of these papers are about (in-)security or
fraud and mostly assume ideal business environments. As such more focus should be attributed
to identifying the (consistency) relationships which are relevant or useful in the context of Risk
Assessment.
Finally, the current tool support is not intended for the type of models needed to describe
fraud. The tool and computation engine need to at least support the supplementary conventions
described in Section 1.2. Furthermore, the tool only generates static spreadsheets showing the
financial results. All the graphs shown in this document were created manually by running the
tool multiple times with variations in one parameter and extrapolating a function that could be
used to plot the graphs. In the future, this should be supported natively by the tool, as graphs
showing the variation of profit based on a parameter are much more revealing than single results.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions
Overall, we have observed that e3value models successfully captured the economic aspects of the
misuse scenarios modelled. Furthermore, they were somewhat easier to create as less knowledge
about the technical infrastructure was needed and the the building blocks and syntax are simpler.
They also provided more flexibility and ease of use when discussing telco fraud.
However, we do expect that for similar attacks, which (also) exploit technical or social vulnerabil-
ities, the e3value models will not be sufficient. In the latter two scenarios, which involve hacking
of a TSP’s or TSP customer’s infrastructure, critical information about the attack is missing.
In this case, an integrated model, describing all relevant aspects of the scenario or two different
models showing alternative (but potentially overlapping) views would be necessary. Considering
the fact that being able to only create one type of model would in some cases increase usability
while decreasing complexity, it seems the latter version is preferable. This, of course, brings
about the issue of deriving complex attacks, risks, and respective countermeasures from these
two different models in a consistent and meaningful way. For the project, this means that during
the next year, the possibility should be explored of generating Attack Trees, Timed Automata
or whatever other attack representation is chosen from e3value models.
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Appendix A
Coordination models
Because e3value models do not include any process information, sometimes it is necessary to
create an activity diagram or some other kind of coordination model in order to fully describe
the scenario.
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Figure A.1: Coordination model of scenario 2
Bibliography
[1] HB. Nederland. . Historie van het pinnen - pin.nl. http://www.pin.nl/consument/
historie-pinnen/ accessed Nov 2014, 2014.
[2] S. B. E. Betalen.
[3] Emerce. Recordaantal pinbetalingen in 2013. http://www.emerce.nl/wire/
recordaantal-pinbetalingen-2013 accessed Nov 2014, 2014.
[4] Jaap Gordijn. Value-based requirements Engineering: Exploring innovatie e-commerce ideas.
PhD thesis, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2002.
[5] Jaap Gordijn, Hans Akkermans, and Hans Van Vliet. Business modelling is not process
modelling. In Conceptual Modeling for E-Business and the Web, ECOMO 2000, volume
1921 of LNCS. Springer, 2000.
[6] Jaap Gordijn and Hans Van Vliet. On the interaction between business models and software
architecture in electronic commerce. In Addendum to the proceedings of the 7th European
Software Engineering Conference/Foundations of Software Engineering / ESEC 1999, 1999.
[7] Jaap Gordijn and Roel Wieringa. A value-oriented approach to e-business process design.
In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference, CAiSE 2003, volume 2681 of LNCS,
pages 390–403. Springer Verlag, 2003.
[8] ING.
[9] Wil Janssen, Rene van Buuren, and Jaap Gordijn. Business case modelling for e-services.
In D. R. Vogel, P. Walden, J. Gricar, and G. Lenart, editors, Proceedings of the 18th BLED
conference (e-Integration in Action), pages cdrom„ Maribor, SL, 2005. University of Mari-
bor.
[10] KPN.
[11] D. Richard. Kuhn, National Institute of Standards, and Technology (U.S.). PBX vulner-
ability analysis [microform] : finding holes in your PBX before someone else does / D.
Richard Kuhn. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Technology Administration, National Institute of
Standards and Technology ; For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O Gaithersburg, Md.
: [Washington, D.C, 2001.
[12] Vincent Pijpers and Jaap Gordijn. Bridging business value models and business process
models in aviation value webs via possession rights. In Proceedings of the 20th Annual
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, page cdrom. Computer Society Press,
2007.
26
[13] Terry Regan.
[14] Dong-Hee Shin. Towards an understanding of the consumer acceptance of mobile wallet.
Comput. Hum. Behav., 25(6):1343–1354, November 2009.
[15] Prince Mayurank Singh. Integrating business value in enterprise architecture modeling and
analysis, August 2013.
[16] SMARTVOX.
[17] Roel Wieringa and Jaap Gordijn. Value-oriented design of correct service coordination
protocols. In Proceedings of the 20th ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, pages 1320–
1327. ACM Press, 2005.
[18] Wikipedia. Business telephone system — Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, 2014.
27
